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ABSTRACT 
Previous research suggests that gruesome color photographs can induce high levels of emotion in 
jurors, which may detract from the probative value of trial evidence. Further, these gruesome 
photos may unduly increase conviction rates and punitiveness in jurors. The current study 
explored the impact of gruesome trial evidence (gruesome photos vs. non-gruesome images) and 
investigated possible interventions against the extralegal bias associated with such photos 
utilizing different methods of cognitive training (holistic, analytical, or control). In addition, the 
impact of jurors’ disgust sensitivity and Moral Foundations Theory were examined in relation to 
juror decision-making. Analyses revealed that jurors’ experiences of several emotions were 
related to verdict. The moral foundations and jurors’ post-trial emotions were significantly 
correlated to case-related judgments. Further, evidence gruesomeness and the moral foundations 
were significantly associated with jurors’ post-trial emotions.
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Mitigating the Biasing Impact of Emotions and Morality: Cognitive Training, Juror 
Emotionality, and Juror Decision-making 
Criminal trials often convey vivid, graphic, emotionally charged evidence and witness 
testimony. Previous research suggests that legal decision-making and confidence in decision-
making may be greatly impacted by one’s moral leanings and/or experiences of emotions (e.g., 
Ask & Pina, 2011; Burd, 2015; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Salerno, 2015; Salerno & 
Peter-Hagene, 2013). For instance, jurors’ experiences of several emotions can predict 
confidence in guilt, make them more willing to punish, and to be more punitive. In addition, 
mock jurors’ differential reliance upon various moral foundations impacts their decision making 
for criminal trials (Burd, 2015). 
Taken together, jurors may be at risk of making biased decisions based (unintentionally) 
on non-probative evidence, their own emotional experience of the trial, and preexisting moral 
beliefs. When legal decisions are improperly made, lives may hang in the balance. Therefore, it 
is important for probative evidence alone to be the basis of jurors’ decision-making. The current 
study investigated an intervention aimed at reducing bias in juror and jury decision-making that 
may be instigated by emotional evidence and pre-existing moral beliefs.  
Emotion, Morality, and the Law 
Emotion. Previous research indicates that juror decision-making can be influenced by the 
experience of several emotions. Anger, for example, can greatly affect decision-making and can 
cause individuals to rely on heuristics when processing important information and to be more 
punitive compared to neutral individuals (Lerner et al., 1998). Further, Ask and Pina (2011) 
found that angry individuals judged ambiguous behaviors as more intentional, believed 
perpetrators had more causal control over situations, and were more likely to punish offenders 
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compared to neutral participants (Ask & Pina, 2011). Here, anger impacted decision making over 
and above the probative value of the evidence.  
Researchers also suggest that different emotions impact decision making in distinct ways: 
For instance, Semmler and Brewer (2002) found that participants induced to experience a sad 
mood were able to more accurately report inconsistencies in testimony compared to a neutral 
mood. Conversely, anger was associated with impaired information processing and a reduction in 
participants’ ability to detect testimonial inconsistencies. Further, anger was positively related to 
participants’ ratings of the prosecution’s credibility and probability that the defendant was guilty 
of committing the crime (Semmler & Brewer, 2002). Thus, research suggests that emotions may 
impact juror decision making over and above the probative evidence presented at trial, which 
indicates that jurors may be susceptible to biased decision-making. What can be done to mitigate 
the impact of these emotions? 
Morality. Generally, many foundations of morality, such as fairness, reciprocity, and the 
protection of others, help humans thrive and work together within groups (Haidt & Joseph, 
2004). Specifically, Moral Foundations Theory suggests that morality is based on separate yet 
related bases: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and 
Sanctity/degradation (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). The foundation of Care/harm focuses on the 
avoidance of pain and suffering and the intent to minimize them. The Fairness/cheating 
foundation focuses on equality and justice, while the Loyalty/betrayal foundation is based on 
attachments to groups and social cohesion. The Authority/subversion foundation focuses on the 
history of humans’ creation of hierarchical structures in society and emphasizes obedience and 
leadership ability. Lastly, the Sanctity/degradation foundation is closely linked with emotions of 
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disgust as related to biological and social contaminants (see Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004).  
These foundations lead us to react to external stimuli differently and inform our attitudes 
relating to moral issues. Haidt and colleagues argue that these moral foundations govern much of 
our morality and moral decision making, and that these foundations lead us to react to moral 
stimuli in fast, automatic ways: The moral foundations tell us what is immoral or moral 
intuitively rather than deliberatively or rationally (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  
While the foundations are highly related to individuals’ moral judgments, the moral foundations 
alone do not form moral judgments. Instead, the Social Intuitionist Model of moral reasoning is 
the mechanism by which our reliance on the moral foundations forms moral intuitions that in 
turn inform our moral judgments. 
Previous models of moral reasoning suggest that such reasoning is the direct cause of 
moral judgments. However, the Social Intuitionist Model of moral judgment and reasoning 
suggests that moral emotions and intuitions precede moral judgments. This model proposes that 
moral intuitions are automatic and fast and often co-occur with moral emotions, such as disgust 
and anger (Haidt, 2001). Although we subjectively feel that we deliberate about moral stimuli 
and then form moral judgments, we instead have fast, automatic moral intuitions first. A moral 
intuition is defined as “…the sudden appearance in consciousness of a moral judgment, including 
an affective valence (good – bad, like – dislike), without any conscious awareness of having 
gone through steps of searching, weighing evidence, or inferring a conclusion” (Haidt, 2001, p. 
818). In this case, one would see a stimulus (e.g., a moral event) and then would automatically 
feel disapproval or approval. Thus, the moral intuition would cause a moral judgment. We form 
judgments and justifications for our moral beliefs after reaching a conclusion or consensus about 
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what we think is right or wrong, moral or immoral. Haidt (2001) argues that we often never even 
begin to reason about our moral intuitions.  
The Social Intuitionist Model is the mechanism by which one’s reliance on the moral 
foundations informs our moral decision-making. Innately, we rely more or less on certain 
foundations (e.g., Fairness, Authority), and this reliance influences how we respond to and think 
about moral issues. Taken together, the moral foundations and the Social Intuitionist Model help 
explain how we make decisions about moral and morally-laden policy issues (e.g., Haidt, 2001; 
Haidt, Graham, & Joseph, 2009; Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012). 
 Previous research indicates that the moral foundations strongly predict one’s political 
affiliation and ideology. Using a scale that measures the degree to which certain foundations are 
endorsed, the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, researchers compared foundation endorsement 
to individuals’ self-subscribed political affiliations. This work revealed that liberals and 
conservatives differ systematically in their endorsement of the moral foundations (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). For instance, liberals strongly endorse 
Care/harm and Fairness/cheating while conservatives endorse all five foundations equally 
(Graham, et al., 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007). Further, these differences between conservatives 
and liberals relate to their moral/political judgments: Koleva and colleagues (2012) found that 
the reliance on the moral foundations predicts and explains participants’ moral judgments about 
such issues as immigration and abortion, among others. 
Moral Foundations Theory suggests that differences in the reliance on the moral 
foundations relates to dissimilarities in moral and political beliefs. Therefore, it follows that 
differential reliance on the moral foundations may impact juror and jury decision-making during 
criminal trials. In this way, jurors may make fast, automatic, intuitive judgments about morally 
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repugnant crimes, and these intuitions may drive “decision-making” over and above probative 
evidence. 
Emotion, morality, and decision making. Haidt (2001) argues that moral intuitions and 
judgments are often associated with and co-occur alongside moral emotions. For example, 
Wheatley and Haidt (2005) found that inducing disgust increases the severity of moral 
judgments.  In addition, Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) explored the effects of anger and 
disgust in a mock jury study involving graphic photographic murder evidence. Here, disgust was 
a better predictor of moral outrage than anger, and moral outrage mediated the relation between 
disgust and verdict confidence for all levels of anger. This study lends further support to the idea 
that Sanctity/degradation values are the strongest predictors of moral intuitions for certain kinds 
of moral transgressions (Koleva et al., 2012). Further, it serves as evidence that moral intuitions 
and emotions do in fact affect juror decision making in important ways. 
New research indicates that the differential reliance on the moral foundations may in fact 
influence legal decision-making. Burd (2015) examined the influence of mock jurors’ reliance on 
the moral foundations in relation to their judgments across several crimes (child molestation, 
armed robbery, and murder). Analyzing mock jurors’ scores from the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire, results indicate that participants’ Authority/subversion scores were positively 
related to conviction rates for murder. Further, Care/harm and Authority/subversion were 
significantly and positively related to confidence in guilt and perceptions of case strength, 
despite the presentation of an overall weak case. In addition, across all crimes, Loyalty/betrayal, 
Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation were significantly and positively related to the 
experiences of several moral emotions, including anger, anxiety, contempt, and disgust (Burd, 
2015). 
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Haidt states, “…people rarely override their initial intuitive judgments just by reasoning 
privately to themselves because reasoning is rarely used to question one’s own attitudes or 
beliefs” (Haidt, 2001, p. 819). This indicates that, left unquestioned, peoples’ initial judgments 
will stick unless confronted with deliberate reasoning, and even then the reasoning may not be 
able to overcome the initial, gut judgment. These works indicate that emotion and morality may 
interact in the courtroom to create biased decision-making amongst jurors and juries. In addition, 
for gruesome crimes, graphic evidence may lead to strong moral intuitions in jurors, and jurors 
may not engage in deliberative reasoning. Verdicts in such trials may be biased as jurors may be 
incapable of balancing probative evidence with strong moral intuitions about emotionally-
charged evidence. Thus, the question remains: What can be done to combat extra-legal bias?  
Juror aids and innovations. Scholars have investigated several innovations and 
interventions to reduce juror bias. Research by Kaplan and Miller (1978) suggests that increasing 
the trustworthiness and reliability of trial evidence can reduce such biases. In addition, 
rehabilitative voir dire has been used in an attempt to diminish bias in jurors. During voir dire, 
potential jurors may indicate an inability to remain impartial during trial. When this occurs, 
judges may attempt to “rehabilitate” potential jurors by asking them to ignore their biases and to 
base decision-making and verdicts solely on the law and evidence presented. However, in one 
study, Crocker and Kovera (2010) found that rehabilitation reduced perceptions of guilt in a case 
involving an insanity defense for biased and unbiased participants. Overall, research on juror 
bias reduction is mixed. However, other interventions may successfully increase the cognitive 
processing of evidence by jurors, which in turn could increase jurors’ reliance on probative 
evidence. 
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Scholars have explored several ways to help jurors process, remember, and utilize 
complex trial evidence and information. Researchers have employed such aids as note-taking, 
allowing jurors to ask questions during trial, implementing juror check-lists for complex 
scientific evidence, creating jury notebooks, utilizing judicial pre-instruction, allowing jurors 
access to trial transcripts during deliberation, and utilizing combinations of these innovations 
(see Dann, Hans, & Kaye, 2004; ForsterLee & Horowitz, 2003; Hannaford, Hans, & 
Munsterman, 2000). Results have been mixed regarding such aids, with some assisting jurors 
more than others. 
 Several teams of researchers have investigated the impact of note taking and the use of 
notebooks on juror comprehension of trial evidence. In a study conducted by ForsterLee and 
Horowitz (2003), note taking allowed jurors to make proper distinctions in regards to injury 
severity, helped jurors remember more case facts, helped jurors distinguish between the least and 
most deserving plaintiffs in terms of damage awards, and gave jurors a greater satisfaction of the 
trial process compared to jurors not allowed to take notes. Generally, note taking facilitated juror 
comprehension of complex evidence and led to greater jurors satisfaction than no innovations. 
 Pre-instruction may also assist jurors with trial evidence comprehension. Pre-instruction 
informs jurors of case-specific laws before trial evidence is presented. ForsterLee and Horowitz 
(2003) found that pre-instruction enhanced jurors’ cognitive processing, helped jurors recall 
more probative evidence, increased correct verdicts, and did not prejudice jurors against either 
party (prosecution or defense) unless evidence was extremely complex. Thus, pre-instruction has 
many benefits and may improve juror processing of trial evidence.  
Researchers have also explored the combined impact of juror aids on juror 
comprehension of trial evidence. ForsterLee and Horowitz (2003) found that jurors who were 
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given pre-instructions and allowed to take notes had a superior ability to organize complicated 
case facts and appointed more appropriate awards than those who could not utilize such aids.  
However, these effects were strongest when the case was moderately complex, as note taking 
was not as helpful when the evidence complexity was extremely high. ForsterLee and Horowitz 
(2003) also discovered that note taking was more effective than allowing jurors to review trial 
transcripts. In fact, note taking alone was more effective than combining note taking with the 
allowance of trial transcripts. Thus, note taking may facilitate more understanding and a clearer 
organization of complex trial material than other aids. 
In addition, Dann and colleagues (2004) studied the impact of juror note taking during 
trial and found that jurors were enthusiastic about the ability to take notes during trial. Given the 
opportunity to take notes, most jurors took notes and found it very helpful and believed that note 
taking helped them to remember and understand evidence. However, no effect of note taking on 
juror comprehension was found before deliberation (Dann et al., 2004). Nevertheless, data 
suggest that the use of multiple innovations in combination may be helpful to juror 
comprehension of complex trial evidence compared to note taking alone. Although results were 
mixed, some aids did in fact increase juror comprehension of complex evidence, even when 
controlling for juror education. 
Field research suggests that allowing jurors to deliberate during trial is helpful in 
increasing juror comprehension of evidence. Hannaford and colleagues (2000) found that 
allowing discussion amongst jurors during trial was subjectively helpful to jurors, and jurors 
perceived such discussions to be helpful in resolving confusion. However, this aid did not 
objectively improve juror judgments or understanding of the law or evidence (Hannaford et al., 
2000).  
MITIGATING THE BIASING IMPACT OF EMOTIONS  	  
	   	   	  9 
A promising new innovation? New research conducted by Talhelm, Haidt, Oishi, 
Zhang, Miao, and Chen (2015) investigated the impact of different forms of simple cognitive 
training on liberal and conservatives’ endorsement of policy-related issues. In a series of 
experiments, Talhelm and colleagues (2015) discovered that liberals are more analytical in 
thought style than moderates and conservatives. Further, researchers found that brief cognitive 
training can lead participants to think more analytically (more like liberals) or more holistically 
(more like conservatives). Importantly, this brief cognitive training was effective for liberals and 
conservatives and was not impacted by participants’ preexisting political beliefs.   
Could such an intervention be used in the jury system, and might this training increase 
analytical processing in jurors? If so, such training could increase the focus on and processing of 
probative evidence to reduce biased decision-making during morally and emotionally charged 
trials. The current study aimed to investigate the potential effects of analytical and holistic 
training on jurors’ decision-making and emotionality during emotional and gruesome trials. 
The present study. Research suggests that decision-making in many contexts is highly 
malleable; however, cognitive training may help jurors effectively process emotionally- and 
morally-laden trial testimony in order to hone in on probative evidence alone. The current study 
investigated a potential technique to reduce bias in the decision-making processes of jurors in an 
attempt to activate more analytical, balanced information processing and decision-making, 
particularly when emotion is highly salient and moral intuitions may be strong. It was 
hypothesized that analytical training would mitigate the effects of jurors’ pre-existing moral 
intuitions and emotions. Conversely, it was posited that holistic training would exacerbate the 
biasing impact of jurors’ moral leanings and experience of moral emotions on legal decision-
making. Lastly, it was posited that jurors’ differential reliance on the moral foundations would 
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impact decision-making and would be related to jurors’ experiences of post-trial emotions. 
Taken together, this research examined a simple technique to reduce moral and emotional bias in 
jurors in an attempt to help refocus juror attention on probative evidence.  
Methodology 
Participants 
Approximately three hundred participants completed all assigned tasks as part of the 
current study. Nearly three hundred forty participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, but several did not complete all measures. In addition, ten individuals were excluded from 
analyses as they did not answer all manipulation check questions correctly.  
All participants received $0.50 for their participation. Participants’ ages ranged from 18 
to 72 (M = 36.57, SD = 13.08). Participants were 46.2% female. The participants were 6% 
Black/African American, 79.9% White/Caucasian, 6.7% Hispanic, 1% Native American, 5.4% 
Asian/Pacific Islander, and 1%  “other”. Less than one percent (.7%) of participants had less than 
four years of high school, 10.3% graduated high school or had a GED, 36.2% had some college 
education, 37.5% had a college degree, 6% had some graduate school education, and 9.3% had a 
graduate degree.  
Design 
 The current study employed a 2 (Gruesome evidence: High vs. Low) x 3 (Cognitive 
training: Analytical vs. Holistic vs. Control) fully randomized between-subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions. (See Table 1). 
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Table 1 
Study Design 
  
Cognitive Training 
 
 
Analytical 
 
 
Holistic 
 
Control 
 
Gruesome 
evidence 
 
 
High 
 
 
High, 
Analytical 
 
 
High, 
Holistic 
 
High, 
Control 
 
Low 
 
 
Low, 
Analytical 
 
 
Low, 
Holistic 
 
Low, 
Control 
 
 
Materials 
Evidence presentation. All participants read an abbreviated evidence presentation 
detailing a gruesome murder wherein a husband was accused of murdering his wife in their 
home. The evidence presentation included a brief case summary; preliminary instructions from 
the judge; summaries of the prosecution and defense’s opening statements; a coroner’s report; a 
timeline of events; a map of the victim and defendant’s home; summaries of key witnesses, 
including a locksmith, a pathologist for the prosecution, the defendant, the defendant’s neighbor, 
a forensic scientist for the defense, and a pathologist for the defense; summaries of the 
prosecution and defense’s closing statements; and closing instructions from the judge. Evidence 
presentation materials were based on work by Bright and Goodman-Delahunty (2006), Salerno 
(2015), and an actual murder trial (R v. Valevski, 2000). 
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 Experimental manipulations. In the high gruesome evidence conditions, the coroner's 
report included four graphic, gruesome color photographs of the murder victim, whereas in the 
low gruesome evidence conditions, these photographs were excluded. Instead, in the low 
gruesome evidence conditions, four blank pages from a coroner’s report were included. All other 
evidence presented in the coroner’s report remained the same with the exception of the four 
photographs or four blank pages from the coroner’s report. As mentioned above, the gruesome 
photos were based on work by Bright and Goodman-Delahunty (2006), Salerno (2015), and an 
actual murder trial (R v. Valevski, 2000). 
All participants also engaged in a version of the triad task (Chiu, 1972; Talhelm et al., 
2015). Following the procedures of Talhelm and his colleagues (2015), mock jurors were 
randomly assigned to one of three cognitive training conditions utilizing a version of the triad 
task (analytical vs. holistic vs. control). In all cognitive training conditions, participants saw 
several groups of three items and are asked to indicate which two are most related. Directions for 
this task varied by condition: In the analytical conditions, subjects were asked to pair objects 
based on their abstract categories and were given an example of the task. In the holistic 
conditions, participants were asked to group objects that shared a relationship or because one of 
them used the other. In the control conditions, mock jurors were asked to indicate which two of 
the three were most closely related to one another. 
Previous work by Burd (2015) indicated that mock jurors’ moral foundations predicted 
case-related judgments, including verdict, even though all mock jurors read the same case 
descriptions and all evidence was held equal. Therefore, this cognitive training manipulation may 
help mock jurors think more analytically (more like liberals) who made more legally correct 
decisions in previous research. 
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Measures 
Emotion questionnaire. All participants completed a questionnaire regarding their 
current state of emotions (e.g., fear, anger, anxiety, shame, happiness, calm, sadness). These 
items were taken from the PANAS-X, but not all items from the PANAS-X were used (Watson 
& Clark, 1999). Participants were asked to “… answer the following questions about how you 
feel, right now, using the scale below.” Participants responded using a Likert scale ranging from 
1 (Very slightly or not at all) to 5 (Extremely). Participants completed the emotion questionnaire 
immediately before the cognitive training task and again immediately after the evidence 
presentation. 
Manipulation checks. Participants were asked several questions pertaining to the 
evidence presentation in order to determine if they paid adequate attention to materials and 
stimuli. Participants who did not respond accurately to all questions were excluded from the data 
(n = 10). 
Case-related judgments questionnaire. Participants responded to several case-related 
judgments. Questions measured mock jurors’ perception of guilt, confidence in guilt, prison 
sentence assigned (for mock jurors who deemed the defendant guilty), questions regarding case 
strength, likelihood the defendant took the life of the victim, evidence sufficiency/strength, and 
how much sympathy they felt for the victim.   
Disgust Scale-Revised (DS-R). Disgust sensitivity was measured using the Disgust Scale 
– Revised (Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji et al., 2009). This questionnaire measures 
participants’ trait sensitivity to disgust. Participants respond to questions such as "It bothers me 
to hear someone clear a throat full of mucus." Previous research indicates that disgust sensitivity 
or the experience of disgust is related to increased severity in moral judgments. Therefore, mock 
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jurors who are more prone to disgust might be more prone to convict the defendant and may be 
more punitive than those less easily disgusted. 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham, 
Haidt, Nosek, Iyer, Koleva, & Ditto, 2008) measures the degree to which certain moral 
foundations are endorsed. Previous work suggests that the moral foundations are related to 
individuals’ endorsements of morally-relevant political policies (e.g., abortion, immigration) 
(e.g., Koleva et al., 2012). Further, recent work suggests that the moral foundations are 
predictive of mock jurors’ decision-making (Burd, 2015).  
Demographic questionnaire. Lastly, participants responded to several demographic 
questions, including questions regarding age, gender, race, political ideology, education, and 
household income.  
Procedures 
All participation for this study occurred online. All materials and measures were 
displayed online using Qualtrics surveys, all of which were administered on Amazon's 
Mechanical Turk. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions.  
First, mock jurors gave consent for their study participation. Next, participants completed 
the emotions questionnaire in order to establish participants’ baseline emotional states. Then, 
participants completed one version of the triad task based on random assignment (either the 
control, holistic, or analytical task). Upon completing the training, participants were again 
reminded of the potential to view graphic trial evidence from a real murder and were asked to 
give consent again by typing “I am aware.” Next, participants were presented with the evidence 
presentation. Here, they were randomly assigned to the gruesome evidence conditions (high vs. 
low). The evidence presentation included the brief case summary; preliminary instructions from 
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the judge; summaries of the prosecution and defense’s opening statements; a coroner’s report; a 
timeline of events; a map of the victim and defendant’s home; summaries of key witnesses, 
including a locksmith, a pathologist for the prosecution, the defendant, the defendant’s neighbor, 
a forensic scientist for the defense, and a pathologist for the defense; summaries of the 
prosecution and defense’s closing statements; and closing instructions from the judge. After 
reading the evidence presentation, participants again completed the emotion questionnaire. Next, 
participants completed manipulation checks and responded to case-related judgment questions. 
Participants then completed the Disgust Scale – Revised. Lastly, participants completed the 
Moral Foundations Questionnaire and answered several demographic questions. 
Data Analyses and Results 
Verdict 
Overall verdict. Overall, 61% of participants rated the defendant not guilty while 39% 
found the defendant guilty.  
Impact of the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, cognitive training / 
gruesomeness evidence, and juror emotion. A hierarchical logistic regression was conducted 
to determine the effects of the moral foundation, disgust sensitivity, cognitive training and 
gruesome evidence, and juror emotion on verdict. The five moral foundations were entered at 
step 1, disgust sensitivity at step 2, gruesome evidence and cognitive training at step 3, and 
finally, juror emotions at step 4. The analyses revealed no outliers, and all variables had standard 
errors less than two indicating no multicollinearity existed. The omnibus test of the model was 
significant (Block probability = 50.35, p < .001). The accuracy rate of the model was 74.5%.  
Analyses revealed that fear, anger, disgust, inspiration, and strength significantly 
predicted verdict when the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, gruesome evidence, and 
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cognitive training were controlled for. Results indicated that a higher experience of fear resulted 
in a 47% decreased likelihood of conviction (b = -.63, SE = .28, Wald = 5.10, p = .02, odds ratio 
= .53). In addition, an increase in the experience of anger resulted in a 63.2% increase in 
likelihood to convict (b = .49, SE = .27, Wald = 3.19, p = .07, odds ratio = 1.63). Further, an 
increase in disgust resulted in a 113.9% increase in likelihood to convict (b = .76, SE = .19, Wald 
= 15.68, p < .001, odds ratio = 2.139). An increase in the experience of inspiration led to a 
139.4% increase in the likelihood to convict (b = .87, SE = .27, Wald = 10.60, p = .001, odds 
ratio = 2.394). Lastly, an increase in the experience of strength was associated with a 37.1% 
decrease in likelihood to convict (b = -.46, SE = .197, Wald = 5.52, p = .02, odds ratio = .63). 
The experience of all other juror emotions was not significantly associated with verdict decision. 
(See Table 2). 
A follow-up model was tested which included education at step 1, the five moral 
foundations at step 2, disgust sensitivity at step 3, gruesome evidence and cognitive training at 
step 4, and finally, juror emotions at step 5. The model remained significant (p = .003), and 
again only some of the moral emotions remained significant predictors while controlling for all 
other variables (education, moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and gruesome evidence and 
cognitive training). 
Table 2 
Percentage of Guilty Verdicts by Condition 
 Cognitive Training 
Analytical Holistic Control 
 
Gruesome 
evidence 
 
High 21 (7.2%) 17 (5.8%) 17 (5.8%) 
Low 15 (5.1%) 23 (7.9%) 21 (7.2%) 
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Impact of individual differences. A chi-square test of independence was performed to 
examine the relation between gender and verdict. This analysis revealed a significant relation, X2 
(2, N = 292) = 20.97, p < .001. Women were more likely than men to convict the defendant. Age, 
education, ethnicity, and income were not significantly related to verdict, ps >.05. 
Verdict Confidence 
Overall verdict confidence. Verdict confidence ranged from zero to one hundred with a 
mean of 69.85 (SD = 20.08). 
Impact of gruesome evidence and cognitive training. In order to test the hypothesis 
that gruesome evidence and cognitive training would affect juror confidence in verdict, a two-
way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The omnibus test of the main effect of 
gruesome evidence was not significant, F (1, 287) = 1.51, p = .22, ηp2 = .005.  In addition, the 
omnibus test of the main effect of cognitive training was not significant, F (2, 287) = .41, p = 
.67, ηp2 = .003.  Lastly, the interaction between emotion and cognitive training was also not 
significant, F (2, 287) = .68, p = .51, ηp2 = .005. 
Impact of the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions. In order to 
test the hypothesis that the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions would 
affect verdict confidence, a multiple regression was performed. Analyses revealed that the moral 
foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions were not significantly related to verdict 
confidence, p > .05. 
Sentencing 
Overall sentencing. Sentencing ranged from twenty-five to one hundred years with a 
mean of 72.05 years (SD = 29.88 years). 
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Impact of gruesome evidence and cognitive training. In order to test the hypothesis 
that gruesome evidence and cognitive training would affect juror punitiveness as measured by 
sentence, a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The omnibus test of the 
main effect of gruesome evidence was not significant, F (1, 105) = .004, p = .95, ηp2 < .001.  In 
addition, the omnibus test of the main effect of cognitive training was not significant, F (2, 105) 
= .21, p = .82, ηp2 = .004.  The interaction between emotion and cognitive training was also not 
significant, F (2, 105) = .16, p = .85, ηp2 = .003. (See Table 3). 
Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations of Sentencing by Condition 
                       M           SD 
1. Highly Gruesome / Analytical Training                            72.40                 29.14 
2. High Gruesome / Holistic Training                                   67.94                 32.26 
3. High Gruesome / Control Training                           76.24                 31.76 
4. Low Gruesome / Analytical Training                                70.87                 32.48 
5. Low Gruesome / Holistic Training                                    71.96                 30.27 
6. Low Gruesome / Control Training                            72.63                 27.61 
 
Impact of the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions. In order to 
test the hypothesis that the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions would 
affect juror punitiveness as measured by sentence, a multiple regression was performed. 
Analyses revealed that the moral foundations, disgust sensitivity, and juror emotions were not 
significantly related to sentencing, p > .05. 
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Case Related Judgments 
Impact of gruesome evidence and cognitive training. Next, analyses were conducted to 
explore the relation between gruesome evidence and cognitive training on jurors’ case related 
judgments. A two-way MANOVA revealed that cognitive training did not significantly predict 
case related judgments, Wilks’ λ = .729, F (28, 140) = .857, p = .674, ηp2 = .146. In addition, 
gruesome evidence did not significantly impact case related judgments, Wilks’ λ = .865, F (14, 
70) = .777, p = .690, ηp2 = .135. Lastly, there was no significant interaction, Wilks’ λ = .791, F 
(28, 140) = .624, p = . 928, ηp2 = .111. 
Impact of the moral foundations. Next, analyses were performed to explore the relation 
between the moral foundations and case related judgments. Analyses revealed that the moral 
foundations were significantly related to several case related judgments. Overall, mock jurors 
with higher scores on the “binding” foundations (Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity) were more 
likely to favor the prosecution and to perceive the defense’s witnesses and evidence as weaker. 
Interestingly, mock jurors with higher Care scores were also more likely to favor the prosecution 
and more likely to perceive the defense’s case as weak. (See Table 4). 
Impact of juror emotions. Analyses were conducted to explore the relation between 
jurors’ post-trial emotions and case-related judgments. Analyses revealed that jurors’ post-trial 
emotions were significantly related to several case-related judgments. Overall, jurors’ 
experiences of higher levels of negative post-trial emotions was associated with a stronger, more 
favorable perception on the prosecution and a weaker, worse perception of the defense. For 
example, higher scores on anger, contempt, disgust, sadness, and upset were significantly and 
positively related to perceptions of the prosecution’s witnesses and evidence and significantly 
and negatively related to perceptions of the defense’s witnessed and evidence. Conversely, mock 
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jurors’ experiences of positive post-trial emotions were significantly and positively related to 
perceptions of the defense and significantly and negatively related to perceptions of the 
prosecution. (See Tables 5 and 6). 
Juror Emotions 
Impact of gruesome evidence and cognitive training. Next, analyses were conducted to 
explore the relation between gruesome evidence and cognitive training on jurors’ experience of 
emotion post-trial. A two-way MANOVA revealed a significant multivariate effect for gruesome 
evidence, Wilks’ λ = .834, F (19, 219) = 2.291, p = .002, ηp2 = .166. There was no significant 
effect for cognitive training, Wilks’ λ = .859, F (38, 438) = .908, p = .630, ηp2 = .073. In 
addition, there was no significant interaction, Wilks’ λ = .896, F (38, 438) = .651, p = .947, ηp2 = 
.053. 
Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were examined.  
Significant univariate main effects for gruesome evidence were obtained. Gruesome evidence 
was significantly related to disgust (F (1, 237) = 14.650, p < .001, ηp2 = .058), sadness (F (1, 
237) = 4.410, p = .037, ηp2 = .018), surprise (F (1, 237) = 7.835, p = .006, ηp2 = .032), and upset 
(F (1, 237) = 7.972, p = .005, ηp2 = .037). 
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Table 4 
Correlations Between the Moral Foundations and Case-related Judgments          
     Care/      Fairness/     Loyalty/    Authority/       Sanctity/ 
                           Harm     Cheating     Betrayal    Subversion    Degradation 
 
 
1. Verdict confidence  .002            .027           .082          .153**        .080 
 
2. Prison sentence   .051           .174          -.046       .001                  .025 
 
3. Defense case strength            -.067      -.033          -.064         -.058       -.179** 
 
4. Likelihood defendant took .203**       .150* .191**       .155**         .221** 
the victim’s life 
 
5. Prosecution’s evidence  .158**       .110 .177**       .169**        .231**  
sufficiency 
 
6. Strength of physical evidence .087       .051 .130*       .154**        .188** 
 
7. Strength of coroner’s report .161**       .095           .197**       .230**        .209** 
 
8. Strength of locksmith’s  .099       .039 .154**       .158**        .187**  
testimony 
 
9. Strength of prosecution’s .101           .091 .153**       .173**        .207** 
pathologist 
 
10. Strength of defendant’s  .004      -.001 .092       .099        .027 
testimony 
 
11. Strength of neighbor’s  .133*       .065 .050       .058        .038 
testimony 
 
12. Strength of defense’s forensic -.047       -.035         -.195**       -.097                -.150* 
scientist 
 
13. Strength of defense’s  -.019        -.024 -.123*         -.036        -.117* 
pathologist 
 
14. Sympathy felt for victim .215**        -.194 .048         .061                  .076 
  
Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01
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To explore these differences further, an independent-samples t-test was conducted. 
Results indicated that jurors in the low gruesome evidence conditions (M = 2.06, SD = 1.233) 
were significantly less disgusted than jurors in the high gruesome evidence conditions, M = 2.68, 
SD = 1.32, t (241) = -3.798, p < .001. In addition, jurors in the low gruesome evidence conditions 
(M = 2.07, SD = 1.258) were significantly less sad than jurors in the high gruesome evidence 
conditions, M = 2.42, SD = 1.296, t (241) = -2.094, p = .037. Further, jurors in the low gruesome 
evidence conditions (M = 1.82, SD = 1.115) were significantly less surprised than jurors in the 
high gruesome evidence conditions, M = 2.26, SD = 1.297, t (241) = -2.832, p = .005. Lastly, 
jurors in the low gruesome evidence conditions (M = 1.85, SD = 1.143) were significantly less 
upset than jurors in the high gruesome evidence conditions, M = 2.28, SD = 1.205, t (241) = -
2.866, p = .005. 
Impact of the moral foundations. Next, analyses were conducted to explore the relation 
between the moral foundations and jurors’ experiences of post-trial emotions. Analyses revealed 
that the moral foundations were significantly related to several post-trial emotions. Overall, 
jurors’ scores on Care, Fairness, and Sanctity were significantly and positively related to jurors’ 
experiences of several negative emotions post-trial. However, jurors’ scores on Loyalty and 
Authority were only significantly and positively associated with disgust. Further, Care score 
were not significantly associated with any positive emotion post-trial. However, Fairness scores 
were related positively to attentiveness and surprise, Loyalty scores were related to happiness 
and inspiration, and Authority scores were related to attentiveness, calmness, enthusiasm, 
happiness, and inspiration. Lastly, Sanctity scores were only related to feelings of surprise. (See 
Tables 7 and 8). 
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Juror Demographics  
Next, analyses were conducted to explore the relation between the moral foundations and 
jurors’ demographic information. Analyses revealed that the moral foundations were 
significantly related to jurors’ demographic information in many instances. As would be 
expected, jurors’ Care and Fairness scores were significantly and negatively related with political 
ideology while Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity were significantly and positively related (with 
higher scores indicating higher conservatism). In addition, Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity were 
significantly and negatively related to education. (See Table 9). 
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Table 9 
 Correlations Between the Moral Foundations and Juror Demographics             
                                               Disgust       Education       STEM       Political       Income   
         Sensitivity                          Courses      Ideology  
 
1. Care/harm                        .320**          -.112            -.033           -.200**        -.037         
2. Fairness/cheating              .215**          -.105             .000           -.345**         -.109         
3. Loyalty/betrayal              .245**          -.146*          -.066            .353**          .088         
4. Authority/subversion           .226**          -.117**        -.058            .410**           .105       
5. Sanctity/degradation            .385**         -.155**        -.139*          .378**          -.033          
Note. * p <.05, ** p <.01 
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Discussion 
This study examined the influence of brief cognitive training (analytical vs. holistic vs. 
control) and trial evidence gruesomeness (high vs. low) on mock juror decision-making. Overall, 
39% of mock jurors found the defendant guilty. However, results did not support the main 
hypothesis that cognitive training would reduce juror emotional and moral bias: Neither 
analytical nor holistic cognitive training had an impact on juror verdict, sentencing, or case-
related judgments. Instead, results suggest that jurors’ experiences of strong emotions post-trial 
may drive decision-making in many ways, over and above probative evidence, cognitive 
training, and more. 
In the current study, juror post-trial fear, anger, disgust, inspiration, and strength 
impacted verdict: Higher levels of anger, disgust, and inspiration were associated with an 
increased likelihood of conviction. Conversely, higher levels of fear and strength were related to 
a decreased likelihood of conviction while controlling for the moral foundations, disgust 
sensitivity, trial evidence gruesomeness, and cognitive training. The impact of anger and disgust 
on punitiveness is well supported in the literature (e.g., Lerner et al., 1998; Salerno, 2015; 
Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). Overall, jurors’ experiences of positive and negative post-trial 
emotions were related to the conviction of the defendant in meaningful ways. 
 Unexpectedly, cognitive training, trial evidence gruesomeness, the moral foundations, 
disgust sensitivity, and jurors’ post-trial emotions were not related to verdict confidence or 
sentencing. These results stand in contrast to previous works that indicate negative emotions can 
impact verdict confidence and sentencing, specifically, and moral judgments, generally (e.g., 
Burd, 2015; Lerner et al., 1998; Salerno, 2015; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005). 
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Surprisingly, cognitive training, trial evidence gruesomeness, and disgust sensitivity were 
not significantly related to jurors’ case-related judgments. However, as anticipated, the moral 
foundations were in fact associated with several case-related judgments. Overall, the “binding” 
foundations (Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity) were significantly and positively related to case-
related judgments in favor of the prosecution. For instance, mock jurors who scored higher on 
the binding foundations were more likely to perceive the prosecution’s witnesses and evidence to 
be stronger than those with lower scores. In addition, mock jurors who scored high on the 
binding foundations were more likely to perceive the defense’s witnesses and evidence as weak. 
These findings are supported by previous research that found that higher scores on the binding 
foundations were related to a favoring of pro-prosecution evidence, and that conservatives may 
be more conviction-prone than liberals (Burd, 2015). Interestingly, in the current study, mock 
jurors with higher Care scores made decisions and held beliefs similar to individuals with high 
binding foundation scores. Although these groups sometimes differ in their moral assessments, 
because the crime here was a gruesome murder, it follows that individuals with high scores on 
Care and the binding principles would favor the prosecution. 
Jurors’ experiences of post-trial emotions were related to several case-related judgments. 
Overall, the experience of negative emotions (e.g., anger, contempt, disgust, sadness, upset) was 
associated with an increased perception of the prosecution and a decreased perception of the 
defense. Conversely, the experience of positive emotions (e.g., inspiration, enthusiasm) was 
associated with an increased preference for the defense and a decreased assessment of the 
prosecution. Here, the experience of positive emotions, such as inspiration and enthusiasm, may 
reflect a desire to protect others or may indicate increased civic engagement. 
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In addition, trial evidence gruesomeness was associated with jurors’ experiences of 
several emotions, including disgust, sadness, surprise, and upset. Previous work exploring the 
impact of gruesome evidence has found that such evidence can in fact increase the experiences 
of negative emotions in mock jurors (e.g., Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2006; Salerno, 2015; 
Salerno & Peter-Hagene, 2013). Further, previous work suggests that the moral foundations (and 
in particular, Sanctity) are associated with an increased experience of negative emotions in mock 
jurors (e.g., Burd, 2015). 
Lastly, the moral foundations were related to jurors’ experiences of several emotions. 
Generally, Care, Fairness, and Sanctity were related to several negative emotions while Loyalty 
and Authority were associated only with disgust. In addition, Fairness, Authority, and Loyalty 
were associated with several positive emotions, including attentiveness, calmness, enthusiasm, 
and happiness. Again, the experience of these positive emotions may relate to an increased desire 
to be civic.  
In sum, the intended interventions (cognitive training) did not have a significant impact 
on jurors’ decision-making or their experiences of post-trial emotions. However, jurors’ moral 
foundations and post-trial emotions were strongly related to several case-related judgments, and 
the moral foundations were significantly associated with several post-trial emotions and juror 
demographics. 
Implications 
The current study highlights the importance of exploring the role of juror emotions in 
legal decision-making. Here, jurors’ experiences of emotions (both positive and negative) 
significantly predicted verdict over and above cognitive training, the gruesomeness of the 
evidence, and the moral foundations. Importantly, jurors’ experiences of such emotions were 
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predictive of conviction across all conditions, despite all verbal evidence being held equal. In 
addition, the moral foundations and jurors’ post-trial emotions were associated with several case-
related judgments. More research is needed to further explore the impact of the moral 
foundations and the experience of moral emotions on juror decision-making: If individual jurors’ 
emotions and moral leanings are impacting conviction and sentencing, how can we help jurors to 
focus on probative evidence alone when making such important decisions? 
This study suggests that Moral Foundations Theory may hold predictive power for 
attorneys, especially in cases involving gruesome or morally-laden evidence and testimony. For 
instance, if during voir dire attorneys asked questions pertaining to jurors’ disgust sensitivity or 
asked jurors to explain their political affiliation, lawyers could use this information as a loose 
proxy for their moral foundations. If attorneys could estimate potential jurors’ moral leanings, 
they could use their challenges to remove jurors from cases where they might be prone to bias, or 
in the least, attorneys could use this information to avoid discussing evidence in ways that might 
polarize jurors. Further, lawyers could construct their evidence presentations with jurors’ moral 
leanings in mind such that they avoided or crafted arguments in a way that would be appealing to 
jurors and could avoid discussing evidence in a way that would be repulsive or unsettling to 
them. The above findings suggest that the prosecution and defense may often be at odds in the 
best way to approach jurors for their particular side. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 The current study investigated the impact of cognitive training and gruesome trial 
evidence for only one crime: murder. Future research should explore the effectiveness of 
cognitive training for other criminal and civil cases. For example, liberals and conservatives (or 
those with high Care and Fairness vs. Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity scores) might engage with 
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evidence from different crimes in very different ways. In the above murder trial, the crime and 
evidence were so heinous that they may have brought juror decision-making closer together. 
However, in more abstract cases or some civil cases, the divide amongst these individuals may 
be greater. As an example, an intellectual property law case without graphic evidence might 
trigger different moral foundations (e.g., Fairness) rather than those triggered in the above case. 
In addition, the current research utilized photo presentations of evidence. Other 
presentations might be more realistic and effective at conveying information to jurors (e.g., video 
tapes of mock trials). Further, the current study did not investigate the impact of jury deliberation 
on similar cases: Perhaps deliberation helps diminish juror biases. In this venue, jurors must 
verbalize and argue for their perceptions of the case. This act may increase jurors’ deliberative 
processing, which may attenuate the impact of the moral foundations and emotions on juror 
decision-making (see Haidt, 2001). 
In the future, researchers should investigate the impact of the moral foundations and juror 
emotion in a wide range of cases (e.g., other criminal cases, such as robbery or assault, and in 
civil cases as well). Further, researchers should explore how jury deliberation may attenuate the 
impact of the moral foundations and moral emotions on juror and jury decision-making. Lastly, 
the impact of other juror aids (e.g., note taking, deliberating during trial) on the influence of the 
moral foundations and emotions should be examined. 
Jurors are tasked with an enormous burden: they are asked to sift through enormous 
amounts of complex evidence; listen to, encode, and remember volumes of testimony; and to 
provide impartial decisions of justice. In a system so complex, it is easy to see the difficulty in 
separating your personal life, beliefs, emotions, and morals from decisions made during trial. 
Therefore, more research is needed to help lessen the impact of juror extra-legal bias in the 
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courts. Mitigating bias in the courtroom allows for fairer, more balanced trials, which in turn lead 
to fairer, more consistent trial outcomes. Ensuring a focus on probative evidence will give 
strength to the justice system, and a further understanding of juror emotions and the moral 
foundations may shed light on how to change this focus. 
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